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Is The Quest for Corporate Responsibility a Wild Goose Chase? The 
Story of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd. 
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗ 
Abstract 
Peter Lovenheim owned a small stake in Iroquois Brands, Ltd (Iroquois).  He 
proposed that the corporation discontinue its distribution of one product, pâté de foie 
gras, because he objected to the treatment of the geese necessary to the production of 
the product.   Under federal regulations, Iroquois was required to include such 
proposals in the proxy materials it sent out in advance of its annual shareholder 
meeting unless an exception applied.  Iroquois Brands thought it could exclude the 
proposal because the product in question constituted a trivial part of its business.  
Lovenheim went to the District Court seeking an order requiring Iroquois Brands to 
distribute his proposal, and the District Court granted Lovenheim the relief he sought.  
In teaching the case in my Business Associations course, I have often wondered 
how Peter Lovenheim came to make his proposal and whether such whether such 
proposals relating to social or ethical issues (social proposals) are a proper use of the 
shareholder proposal mechanism.   The District Court recognized an extremely broad 
right of shareholders to bring social proposals.  The decision to do so makes more 
sense when the case is situated in its various historical contexts, including the history of 
the governing regulations and the case law that informed the District Court’s opinion. 
The story of Lovenheim contains its share of surprises.  First, Lovenheim was, 
in many ways, the ideal shareholder proponent.  He bought Iroquois stock as an 
investment, but he also had certain ideas about the nature of the company.  He believed 
in the company, and he did not think that distributing pâté de foie gras was consistent 
with his idea of the company.  He was confident that other shareholders would feel the 
same way.  Second, although Lovenheim’s proposal ultimately did not succeed with 
Iroquois’ shareholders, the company did discontinue the product.  Lovenheim thus 
considered his proposal a success, and for several years after the case was decided, he 
                                                 
∗
 Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. The Author is grateful to Peter Lovenheim and 
Ralph Halpern, for their willingness to help me reconstruct the background to this case, and also to my 
colleague, Rebecca Huss, who helped me to situate the case in two of its important contexts, the history 
of animal law and the corporate response to shareholder proposals. 
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teamed up with like-minded people to use the shareholder proposal mechanism to 
pressure corporations to adopt policies promoting the humane treatment of animals.  
The story of Lovenheim thus illustrates the extra-legal consequences of shareholder 
activism. 
After a history of the relevant SEC regulations and their fates in the courts, the 
Article presents the complete narrative of the Lovenheim case, providing details that 
are not captured in the decision or in the limited secondary literature relating to the 
case.  It explains the legal landscape and why the Lovenheim case was such a 
groundbreaking case.  In the final section, the Article explains why the case has 
remained good law in the 25 years since it was decided and why corporations are not 
motivated to pressure the SEC to limit shareholders’ rights to bring social proposals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd.,1 plaintiff Peter Loveneheim asked the 
D.C. District Court to enjoin defendant Iroquois Brands, Ltd. (Iroquois) from omitting a 
shareholder proposal from the proxy materials sent out in advance of its 1985 annual 
shareholder meeting.2   The proposal related to a French product, pâté de foie gras, 
which Iroquois distributed in the United States,3 and which constituted a tiny part of 
Iroquois’ business.4  Lovenheim, the owner of two hundred shareds of Iroquois’ 
common stock,5 called upon Iroquois to investigate whether the French producer 
engaged in forced-feeding of the geese, which Lovenheim considered a form of animal 
cruelty, in producing the pâté de foie gras and, if that turned out to be the case, asked 
Iroquois to consider discontinuing the product until a more humane means of 
production could be developed.6  He decided to submit a shareholder proposal as 
permitted under SEC rule 14a-8 (the Rule)7 promulgated pursuant to Section 14(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ’34 Act).8 Those regulations provide that a 
corporation must include qualifying shareholder proposals in its proxy solicitation 
materials distributed in advance of annual or special shareholder meetings, along with 
the shareholder’s statement in support of the proposal.9  A shareholder proposal is any 
“recommendation or requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take 
action” that a shareholder intends to present at a shareholder meeting.10   The District 
                                                 
1
 618 F.Supp. 554 (D.C. Dist. 1985). 
2
 Id. at 556. 
3
 Id. 
4
 See id. at 559 (finding that sales of the product accounted for none of Iroquois net earnings and less 
than 0.05 percent of its assets). 
5
 Id. at 556. 
6
 Id. 
7
 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. 
8
 48 Stat. 895 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2009)). 
9
 Id.  At the time, the proposal, together with the statement in support, must be no more than 200 
words in length.   Lovenheim, 618 F.Supp. at 557 n .4.  The current version of the rule allows 
shareholders 500 words to support their proposal.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (2009). 
10
 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a). 
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Court granted Lovenheim’s motion and preliminarily enjoined Iroquois from sending 
out its proxy materials without the proposal.11 
Lovenheim is not only a standard teaching case in corporate law courses, it is 
routinely cited by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in response to 
corporations seeking to exclude shareholder proposals from proxy materials on the 
ground that the proposals are not significantly related to the corporations’ businesses.12  
Despite the case’s prominence, its story has not been told in detail.  That is a shame, 
because the details of the case are as surprising as its outcome must have been to 
Iroquois when the court granted Lovenheim the injunction he sought. 
The case seems like a set-up.  At the time he invested in Iroquois, Lovenheim 
was the Government Relations Counsel for the Humane Society of the United States 
(Humane Society) in Washington, D.C.13 Lovenheim had offered the same proposal at 
the 1983 shareholder meeting, at which time only about 5% of the voting shares 
supported it.14  During oral argument, Lovenheim’s counsel conceded that Lovenheim 
had no expectation that the proposal would succeed.15  Lovenheim himself seems to be 
a front for the Humane Society, and his suit appears to be a political crusade 
masquerading as shareholder activism.16  That is, it seems like Lovenheim was in fact 
far more interested in stopping animal cruelty than he was in preserving the value of his 
investment in Iroquois stock.  After all, his proposal could not have succeeded.  Had it 
succeeded it only would have required the corporation to form a committee to 
investigate the process whereby one of its products was produced.  Lovenheim likely 
knew that no such investigation was necessary, since as far as he knew, pâté de foie gras 
                                                 
11
 Lovenheim, 618 F.Supp. at 562 
12
 A Westlaw search reveals that the case has been cited in five published cases and nearly 150 SEC 
No-Action Letters. 
13
 Joyce Tischler, The History of Animal Law, Part I (1972-1987), 1 STAN. J. ANIMAL L.  & POL’Y 3, 
40 (2008). 
14
 Memorandum of Law, submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of 
Corporation Finance appealing the Division’s decision regarding the Lovenheim Shareholder Proposal for 
Iroquois Brands, Ltd., Commission File No. 1-5387, at 2-3 (Jan 30, 1984) (on file with the author). 
15
 See Transcript, Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 
Civ. Action No. 85-0734, at 5 (D.C. Ct. Mar 19, 1985) (on file with the author) (statement of 
Lovenheim’s counsel: “I will be the first to admit that in the 43 years of the shareholder proposal rule 
only two shareholder proposals have ever been passed, and they basically had management support.”). 
16
 One scholar claimed that Lovenheim’s petition had achieved “legendary status” as an example of 
the extent to which social issue proposals had become “trivial and nonsensical.”  Marilyn B. Cane, The 
Revised SEC Shareholder Proxy Proposal System: Attitudes, Results and Perspectives, 11 J. CORP. L. 57, 
61 (1985). 
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was always produced through the brutal force-feeding of geese.17  And so the entire 
shareholder proposal process, even if successful, would have resulted in a report which 
would have confirmed what the shareholders already knew when they overwhelmingly 
rejected the same proposal in 1983. 
This Article is a Law Story.18  Law Stories have many purposes, but their main goal 
is to supplement and demystify the case method of legal pedagogy.19  The case method 
has been criticized for presenting students with the law more or less as a fait accompli.  
The case method assumes a pre-existing body of law that students passively learn rather 
than learning to think of the law as something that they will have a hand in shaping.20  
By placing the (mostly appellate) opinions that law students read in their various 
historical contexts, Law Stories transport students back to a point where the law was 
uncertain and thus enable them to better imagine alternatives to existing legal rules and 
to appreciate the reasoning underling those rules. 
 
Both Peter Lovenheim and Lovenheim, as well as the dynamic of shareholder 
proposals, turn out to be far more complicated than the opinion would lead one to 
expect, and that is why the case provides the basis for an especially rich Law Story.   
First, although Peter Lovenheim looks, when we are first introduced to him, like a 
typical shareholder activist, who was much more interested in pushing a social agenda 
than in promoting good corporate governance, he is actually more like the ideal 
shareholder proponent: he invested in Iroquois to make a profit, and he submitted his 
proposal because he sincerely believed that the distribution of pâté de foie gras was 
inconsistent with Iroquois’ corporate purposes and thus would do harm to the 
corporation’s reputation and thus to its good-will value.   
                                                 
17
 See id. at 7-8 (statement of Lovenheim’s counsel acknowledging that force-feeding is the only way 
pâté de foie gras is produced). 
18
 Many Law Stories are collected in Foundation Press’s LAW STORIES series.  A complete listing of 
the books in the series is provided on Foundation Press’s website: 
http://www.westacademic.com/Professors/ProductSearchResults.aspx?tab=6&series=177&searchtypeasst
ring=ADVANCED-SEARCH. 
19
 See Paul L. Caron, Back to the Future: Teaching Law through Law Stories, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 
405, 406 (2002) (making the “modest claim” that Law Stories can enrich classroom teaching through the 
case method).  In 2005, the Journal of Legal Education recognized the importance of the Law Stories 
approach by devoting a section of one of its issues to “Teaching Law Stories.”  Leslie, Bender, Teaching 
Torts Stories, 55 J. LEG. ED. 108 (2005); Ajay K. Mehorata, Teaching Tax Stories, 55 J. LEG. ED. 116 
(2005); Thomas Ross, Teaching Constitutional Law Stories, 55 J. LEG. ED. 126 (2005); Nancy S. Marder, 
Teaching Civil Procedure Stories, 55 J. LEG. ED. 138 (2005); Laura S. Underkuffler, Teaching Property 
Stories, 55 J. LEG. ED. 152 (2005). 
20
 Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609, 
649 (2007); see also Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEG. ED. 211, 212 (1948) 
(faulting the case method for providing solutions to the problems posed in advance and thus not 
encouraging students to develop their own powers of reasoning and problem-solving). 
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Second, although Lovenheim’s proposal did not get very many votes from his 
fellow shareholders, he regarded the exercise as a success because soon after the 
shareholder vote, Iroquois decided to discontinue distribution of pâté de foie gras.  His 
success – or what he regarded as success – led Lovenheim to pursue other social goals 
through the shareholder proposal mechanism.  His experience as a proponent led him to 
work with other like-minded shareholders on issues relevant to the corporations whose 
shares they owned.   The shareholder proposal mechanism thus stimulates shareholder 
involvement in corporate governance.  The story behind Lovenheim thus illustrates the 
numerous legal and non-legal consequences of a legal rule. 
In Part I, this Article explores the law of shareholder proposals and the reasons 
why the SEC and the courts permit proposals relating to social or ethical issues (social 
proposals) so long as those issues relate to the corporation’s business.  The focus here is 
on the regulation of such social proposals.  Other regulations permitting the exclusion of 
shareholder proposals will be discussed only to the extent that they interact with the rule 
relating to social proposals.  Part II presents the complete narrative of the Lovenheim 
case, providing details that are not captured in the decision or in the limited secondary 
literature relating to the case.  Part III explores the legal landscape in the aftermath of 
Lovenheim.  The decision may well have been a surprising one, and this final section 
explores the reasons why the decision remains the leading case on social proposals.   
As discussed in Part III of the Article, opinions on the value of social proposals 
hinge on opinions on the purposes of corporations and the roles of shareholders in the 
corporations in which they own shares.  Corporations seem to recognize the value of 
permitting social proposals, as they can provide a relatively inexpensive safety valve for 
dissent21 and thus permit the kind of beneficial exchange between management and 
shareholders that promotes the legitimacy of the corporate decision-making processes.  
While corporations might regard these benefits as slight, the expense of social proposals 
is also very small.  Corporations thus have little reason to appear to be attempting to 
obstruct one avenue of meaningful dialogue between management and shareholders 
when the traffic along that avenue relieves stress from the system and thus helps 
guarantee that the main arteries of commerce will not be blocked. 
I.       HISTORY OF SEC IMPLEMENTATION OF § 14(A) OF THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
One might reasonably ask why we permit shareholder proposals in the first 
place.  After all, it is a fundamental premise of corporate governance that managers 
                                                 
21
 Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 
GEO. L. J. 635, 635 (1977); Melvin Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1489, 1494 (1970). 
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manage.22  Shareholders may be the beneficial owners of the corporation, but the 
separation of ownership and control is one of the key advantages of the corporate 
form.23  Although shareholder activism has always been one of the ingredients of U.S. 
corporate governance,24 Congress had acted in the early twentieth century to limit the 
ability of financial institutions to participate in corporate affairs.25  However, in 
response to its perception that corporate management was abusing the proxy solicitation 
process,26 Congress granted the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) broad 
power to regulate proxy solicitations in Section 14(a) of the ’34 Act,27 and the current 
                                                 
22
 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized 
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . ); Paramount 
Communications v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (DE 1994) (“Under normal circumstances, 
neither the courts nor the stockholders should interfere with the managerial decisions of the directors.”); 
Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F.Supp. 810, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing general corporate principles 
granting broad discretion to corporate management in permitting Standard Oil to exclude a shareholder 
proposal related to fostering the development of petroleum reserves and working to create an 
international regime to manage the exploitation of mineral resources). 
23
 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 7 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that centralized 
administration is a necessity in a large corporation and that shareholders as such do not participate in the 
day-to-day management of the corporations); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of 
Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & Econ. 301, 302 (1983) (arguing that “separation of decision and risk-
bearing functions survives . . . in part because of the benefits of specialization of management and risk 
bearing but also because of an effective common approach to controlling the agency problems cause by 
separation of decision and risk-bearing functions”). 
24
 See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States, 
19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 55 (2007) (noting role of financial institutions as shareholder activists in the 
early 20th century). 
25
 See id. (citing the Glass Steagall Act as well as regulatory reforms that followed the 1929 stock 
market crash, which had the cumulative effect of widening the gap between ownership & control in U.S. 
public corporations). 
26
 See Schwartz & Weiss, Assessment of the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L. J. at 636 
(claiming that, prior to 1934, management was soliciting proxies without informing shareholders of the 
matters to be considered at the annual shareholder meeting  and then using the favorable proxies thus 
obtained to control the meeting and for other questionable purposes). 
27
 Section 14(a) of the 34 Act provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities 
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or 
consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) 
registered pursuant to [Section 12 of the ’34 Act]. 
48 Stat. 895 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)). 
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form of shareholder activism is a product of an SEC rule first introduced in 1942,28 the 
predecessor to the current Rule.29  The Rule requires management to include in its 
proxy materials sent out in advance of annual shareholder meetings shareholder 
proposals to be voted on at those meetings so long as the shareholder meets certain 
conditions to qualify as a proponent.30 
Since Section 14(a) simply prohibits deceptive practices in the solicitation of 
proxies, it is not obvious that the Rule implements the congressional legislation.31  The 
SEC interpreted Section 14(a) as insuring fair corporate suffrage and “shareholders who 
were enlightened not only as to the financial condition of the corporation but also as to 
the major questions of policy, which are decided at shareholder meetings.”32  In order to 
ensure that proxy materials accurately reflected all issues that would arise at an annual 
meeting, the SEC interpreted its own rules to permit shareholders to present proposals at 
annual meetings.33  As one court put it, “[C]orporate circulation of proxy materials 
which fail to make reference to a shareholder’s intention to present a proper proposal at 
the annual meeting renders the solicitation inherently misleading.”34  Others have 
pointed out that these rules were necessary in any case to safeguard the rights of 
shareholders recognized under state law.35 
                                                 
28
 The Rule was first designated Rule X-14A-7.  SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3347 
(Dec. 18, 1942), 7 Fed. Reg. 10,655. 
29
 Gillan & Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. at 55.  
30
 In its current version, the Rule requires that shareholders hold a minimum of $2,000 worth of 
shares in the corporation or more than 1% of the corporation’s outstanding shares and hold those shares 
for a minimum of one year prior to making the proposal. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2009). 
31
 See George W. Dent, SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 12 
(1985) (noting that neither the text nor the legislative history of Section 14(a) mentions shareholder 
proposals); Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV. 
425, 465-66 (1984) (arguing that the Rule is hardly likely to achieve congressional intent to assure fair 
corporate suffrage).  
32
 Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 821 F.Supp. 877, 882 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
33
 Id. 
34
 New York City Employees’ Retirement System v. American Brands, Inc. 634 F.Supp. 1382, 1386 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
35
 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 211(b) (mandating an annual shareholder meeting at which 
“any proper business may be transacted”); see also Milton V. Freeman, An Estimate of the Practical 
Consequences of the Stockholder’s Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L. J. 549, 549 (1957) (calling fundamental 
aspects of Rule 14a-8 “an almost necessary consequence of the status of the individual shareholder under 
 The Story of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands 9 
A. Implementation of the Rule 1942-1970 
In enacting Section 14 of the ‘34 Act, Congress responded to an unpleasant by-
product of the separation of ownership and control in the structure of corporations.  
“[A]s management became divorced from ownership and came under the control of 
banking groups, men forgot that they were dealing with the savings of men and the 
making of profits became an impersonal thing.”36  Congress chose to regulate corporate 
proxies as one mechanism for preventing management from circumventing “fair 
corporate suffrage.”37   
 1. Overview of SEC Regulation of Social Proposals 
The SEC’s initial regulatory efforts in this area were directed at promoting “full 
and fair disclosure” in corporate proxy materials.38  In 1942, the SEC took the logical 
next step by adopting a rule that required management to include in its proxy materials 
shareholder proposals that constituted a “proper subject for action by security 
holders.”39  This seemed to offer shareholders an extensive right to provide their input 
to management, but the SEC immediately saw the danger that shareholders would use 
the proposal mechanism to raise matters that bore little relationship to company’s 
affairs.  In 1945, the Commission issued a release opining that “proposals which deal 
with general political social or economic matters” are not proper subjects for 
shareholder action.40   
Between 1943 and 1970, shareholders submitted proposals on a variety of 
issues, but the main focus of shareholder activism in the years between World War II 
and the Viet Nam War was corporate governance.41  Shareholders sought accountability 
from boards and management and improved performance that would increase the value 
                                                                                                                                               
the laws of the various states of incorporation”).  Freeman served in the SEC’s General Counsel Office 
from 1934-42 and as its Assistant Solicitor from 1942-46.  Id. at 549, n.*. 
36
 Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C.Cir. 1970) (quoting 
H.R.Rep. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13 (1934)). 
37
 Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 676 (D.C.Cir. 1970) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d 
Sess. 5, 13 (1934)). 
38
 Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 677 (citing 3 Fed. Reg. 1991 (1938); 5 Fed. Reg. 174 (1940)). 
39
 Rule X-14-7, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,659 (1942). 
40
 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3638 (Jan. 3, 1945). 
41
 See Gillan and Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FINANCE at 56 
(finding that, as late as 1978, 611 of 790 proposals received by member companies of the American 
Society of Corporate Secretaries dealt with governance issues). 
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of their shares.42  There arose in the 1940s the phenomenon of the “gadfly investor.”  
Three such investors, Lewis and John Gilbert43 and Evelyn Davis still accounted for 30 
percent of the resolutions submitted to corporations as late as 1982.44  Their prominence 
among proponents led to cries that the process was being abused by people who were 
not interested in the economic well-being of the corporation but by people interested in 
promoting “crackpot” ideas or “afflicted with insatiate desire for personal publicity.”45 
The SEC’s approach to shareholder proposals has tended to mirror the times.  As 
one commentator put it, in the 1950s, the SEC “added layers of conditions to the rule 
and gutted meaningful shareholder access.”46  The SEC relaxed its restrictions during 
the Viet Nam and Watergate eras before again seeking to “squelch access” during the 
more conservative 1980s.47  In 1984, the SEC granted no-action letters to 78% of the 
corporations that requested them.48  The trend towards a restrictive reading of 
shareholder rights continued into the next decade.  By the mid 90s, the SEC was 30 
percent more likely to permit the exclusion of proposals relating to corporations’ social 
responsibilities than it had been in the 80s.49 
 2. The Rule in the Courts 
The first significant court case testing shareholders’ ability to challenge 
management on issues of corporate governance through the mechanism of the 
                                                 
42
 Id. (characterizing the first three decades of shareholder proposals as “aimed at improving 
performance and raising share values”). 
43
 Lewis Gilbert had been called the “most celebrated minority shareholder.”  LOUIS LOSS, 2 
SECURITIES REGULATIONS 903, n.182 (2d ed. 1961).   His main concerns were undeclared dividends and 
the installation of accounting and monitoring devices to improve directors’ accountability to shareholders. 
Ryan, Rule 14a-8, 23 GA. L. REV. at 117, n.77.  He and his brother accounted for nearly half the 
shareholder proposals offered from 1948-1951 and for nearly 2/3 of the proposals offered in 1955. Alan 
R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 
879, 897, n.74 (1994).  
44
 Gillan and Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FINANCE at 56. 
45
 See Arthur D. Chilgren, A Plea for Relief from Proxy Rule 14a-8, 19 BUS. LAW. 303, 303-04 
(1963) (finding it inconceivable that the majority of shareholder proposals “result from stock purchases 
made with any serious investment intent”). 
46
 Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule, 45 ALA. L. REV. at 879-880. 
47
 Id. at 880. 
48
 Cane, Revised SEC Shareholder Proxy Proposal System, 11 J. CORP. L. at 60. 
49
 Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule, 45 ALA. L. REV. at 882, 913. 
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shareholder proposal came in SEC v. Transamerica Corp.50  The main issue in the case 
was the scope of the “proper subject” for shareholder action referenced in the Rule.  
Transamerica argued that shareholder proposals must relate to a subject matter on which 
shareholders were permitted to vote under all legal requirements, including those found 
in the corporation’s charter and by-laws.51  The SEC took the broader position 
permitting proposals on any subject matter in which a shareholder had an interest under 
state law.52 
The court sided with the SEC, stressing that Transamerica’s reading of the Rule 
would circumvent Congress’s intent “to require fair opportunity for the operation of 
corporate suffrage.”53  Because a corporation must be run for the benefit of its 
stockholders and not for that of its managers,54 management could not be permitted to 
place technical provisions of a corporation’s charter or by-laws beyond the reach of the 
shareholder vote.  “The control of great corporations by a very few persons was the 
abuse at which Congress struck in enacting Section 14(a).”55 
Although it supported shareholder rights in the Transamerica case, between 
1948 and 1954, the SEC repeatedly revised the Rule to limit the ability of shareholders 
to make proposals.  In 1948, the SEC permitted corporations to exclude from their 
proxy statements proposals relating to personal grievances and proposals submitted by 
shareholders who did not attend the annual meeting, either in person or by proxy.56  In 
1952, the SEC made a further attempt to prevent shareholder proposals from becoming 
a forum for the airing of political grievances, permitting corporate managers to exclude 
proposals submitted “primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, 
political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.”57  The propriety of this regulation 
was not tested for nearly two decades.58  The SEC again expanded the permissible 
grounds for exclusion in 1954, permitting corporate management to exclude proposals 
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51
 Id. at 515. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. at 518 
54
 Id. at 517. 
55
 Id.  
56
 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-4185 (Nov. 12, 1948), 13 Fed. Reg. 6678, 6679 (1948). 
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 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-4475 (Dec. 11, 1952), 13 Fed. Reg. 11,430 (1952). 
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 See Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 678 (“So far as we have been able to determine, the 
Commission’s interpretation or application of this rule has not been considered by the courts.”). 
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relating to “ordinary business operations,” proposals that would violate state law and 
resubmitted proposals that had recently been overwhelmingly rejected.59   
Like these SEC revisions to the Rule, the case law in the two decades following 
the Transamerica decision was decidedly favorable to the discretion of both corporate 
management and the SEC, both of which inclined towards excluding proposals, 
especially social proposals.  For example, in Peck v. Greyhound Corp.,60 shareholder 
Peck brought a proposal calling on the corporation to abolish its segregated seating 
system in the South.61  Greyhound sought to exclude the proposal and relied on the 
1945 SEC release cited earlier,62 stating that it was not the intent of the Rule “to permit 
stockholders to obtain the consensus of other stockholders with respect to matters that 
are of a general political, social or economic nature.”63  The SEC staff agreed with the 
corporation’s assessment of the propriety of the proposal, finding that it was not on a 
“proper subject.”64  The Peck court did not go so far as to endorse Greyhound’s 
interpretation of the 1945 SEC Release.  However, it denied Peck’s motion to enjoin 
Greyhound from soliciting proxies and holding its shareholder meeting unless Peck’s 
proposal were included in Greyhound’s proxy materials, finding that that Peck had 
failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.65  The court believed that Peck must 
first pursue SEC review of its staff’s no-action letter before seeking the injunction.66  In 
addition, the court noted that considerable deference was due to the SEC’s 
interpretation of its own rules and also found that Peck could not establish that he would 
be irreparably harmed if his injunction were denied.67 
The trend towards deference to SEC decisions continued in Dyer v. SEC,68 
which raised the same kinds of corporate governance issues that the Third Circuit had 
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 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-4979 (Jan. 1, 1954), 19 Fed. Reg. 246 (1954). 
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 97 F.Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
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 Id. at 680. 
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 See supra, note 39. 
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 Peck, 97 F.Supp. at 680 (citing Release No. 3638 (Jan. 3 1945)). 
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 Id. at 680. 
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 Id. at 680-81. 
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 Id. at 681. 
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 Id.  The proposal may have been excludable in any case because it would have put the company in 
violation of state laws then assumed to be valid.  Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 678. 
68
 289 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1961). 
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found a proper subject for shareholder proposals in Transamerica.  In Dyer, plaintiffs 
sought to force management of the Union Electric Company to include in its proxy 
materials 11 resolutions, by-law amendments and amendments to the articles of 
incorporation.69  Some of the proposals had been the subject of a previous suit, others 
had been submitted and overwhelmingly rejected by shareholders in recent shareholder 
meetings.70   The Dyer court recognized the Transamerica decision as one with which it 
needed to come to terms.  However, it found the two cases easily distinguishable.  In 
Transamerica, the SEC had supported inclusion of the proposals, and doing so was in 
accordance with Delaware law.71  In Dyer, by contrast, the SEC supported the 
corporation’s decision to exclude the proposals.  In addition, the court characterized as 
“almost fanciful” petitioners’ argument that the SEC was without rational basis to 
exclude their proposals, which were inconsistent with Missouri law, when management 
had agreed to the inclusion of a substantively similar proposal that was properly 
submitted under Missouri law.72   
While there seems little doubt that the Dyer court reached the right conclusions 
with respect to the proposals at issue in that case, the opinion is significant in the 
deferential language it adopted with respect to determinations of the SEC staff.73  The 
court took the lack of case law challenging SEC determinations on shareholder 
proposals as evidence that courts and shareholders alike were willing to accept such 
determinations as within the province of the SEC.74 
Deference to management and the SEC characterized decisions in this area into 
the late 60s, when the courts dealt another blow to shareholder activism in Brooks v. 
Standard Oil Co.75  In that case, plaintiff offered a resolution that called on Standard Oil 
to intensify its efforts to encourage exploration of the world’s continental shelves for oil 
                                                 
69
 Id. at 243. 
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 See Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility: The Need to 
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 308 F.Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
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reserves and to encourage the creation of an international regime over undersea mineral 
resources.76  Standard Oil notified the SEC that it intended to exclude the proposal, 
asserting that the proposal could be omitted because it: (1) was not on a proper subject 
for shareholder action; (2) related to ordinary business matters; and (3) primarily sought 
to promote a general economic or political cause.77  Plaintiff, an attorney with expertise 
in the utilization of underwater mineral resources beyond national jurisdiction,78 sought 
a declaratory judgment that his resolution was on a proper subject for action by 
shareholders.79   
The SEC issued Standard Oil a no-action letter on the ground that the proposal 
was not a proper subject for action by shareholders.80  In so doing, the SEC clearly 
violated its own rules.81  The Rule required that, if the corporation claimed a legal 
ground for the omission of a shareholder proposal, the corporation must include a 
“supporting opinion of counsel” with its notice of intention to omit.82  Since Standard 
Oil provided no such opinion of counsel, it could not possibly have met its burden of 
production.83  However, the court concluded that plaintiff was not harmed by the SEC’s 
failure to adhere to its own procedural requirements, as Standard Oil’s opinion of 
counsel would have relied on the same legal arguments as Standard Oil presented in the 
court case.84  Moreover, citing an earlier ruling in the Dyer litigation, the court adopted 
a highly deferential approach to review of SEC no-action letters, accepting the SEC’s 
judgment “unless it can be said that what has been done is without any rational basis on 
all the elements involved.”85 
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 Id. at 811.  
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 Id. at 812 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1), (2) and (5)). 
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 Id. at 811 
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 Id. at 810. 
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 Brooks, 308 F.Supp at 812. 
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 Id. at 813 (citing Sec. Ex. Act. Rel. 4979 (1954)). 
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 Id. at 811, n.2 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d)). 
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 Id. at 811, n.2.  
84
 Id.  
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 Id. at 813 (citing Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir. 1959)).  The court also relied on Peck to 
support its deference to the SEC’s construction of its own rules.  Id. at 813 (citing Peck v. Greyhound 
Corp., 97 F.Supp 679, 681 S.D.N.Y. 1951)). 
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The only issue for the court to resolve then was whether the SEC had correctly 
construed New Jersey law relating to the relative powers of corporate management and 
shareholders.  The parties agreed that there was no New Jersey authority for whether or 
not plaintiff’s proposal was a proper subject for shareholder action.86  However, the 
court cited both New Jersey law and the Standard Oil by-laws, which both provided in 
nearly identical language that “the business and affairs of [the] corporation shall be 
managed by its board.”87  The court further relied on case law to extend something like 
the business judgment rule88 to the shareholder proposal context as well.  The court 
cited two opinions of New Jersey’s Chancery Court, one from 1891 and one from 1942.   
The first stated that “[q]uestions of policy of management . . . are left solely to the 
honest decision of the directors if their powers are without limitation and free from 
restraint.”89  In the later case, the Chancery Court noted the “well-settled rule of law 
that questions of business policy devolve upon the officers and directors. . . .”90  The 
court noted that most of the proposals that had been approved concerned matters 
relating to the selection, retention, and accountability of officers and directors91 and 
appeared to treat that fact as evidence that corporations were only required to include 
such proposals in their proxy materials. 
Thus, three decades after the SEC first adopted the Rule, the scope of the right 
of shareholders to bring proposals at annual meetings was narrowly circumscribed in 
two ways.  First, the SEC was granting no-action letters with respect to all proposals 
except those relating to selection, compensation and accountability of managers.  
Second, the courts had adopted a highly deferential approach to SEC decisions, even if 
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 The Delaware Supreme Court defines the business judgment rule as “a presumption that in making 
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those decisions were taken at the staff level.  This trend was to change dramatically with  
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC.92 
B. The Medical Committee Opinion 
The Medical Committee for Human Rights (Medical Committee) obtained by 
gift shares in the Dow Chemical Company (Dow).93  On March 11, 1968, the Medical 
Committee’s national chairman, Dr. Quentin Young, wrote to Dow and enclosed a first 
version of the Medical Committee’s shareholder proposal.  The proposal requested the 
Board of Directors to amend Dow’s certificate of incorporation to provide “that 
napalm94 shall not be sold to any buyer unless that buyer gives reasonable assurances 
that the substance will not be used on or against human beings.”95  In the accompanying 
letter, Dr. Young conceded that its primary motivation was the Medical Committee’s 
concerns for human life, but he also noted that the Medical Committee’s investment 
advisers suggested that napalm production “is also bad for our company’s business as it 
is being used in the Vietnamese War” in part because it was making it “increasingly 
hard to recruit the highly intelligent well-motivated, young college men so important for 
company growth.”  In addition, the letter noted that the impact on the company for its 
decision to manufacture napalm was global.96   
Dr. Young’s language, espousing an economic interest in the corporation was 
necessary to overcome language in the Rule that permitted a corporation to exclude a 
proposal “if it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted . . . primarily for the 
purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or other 
similar causes.”97  Still, the original proposal was susceptible to exclusion under another 
regulation that permitted omission of proposals seeking management action “with 
respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the 
issuer.”98   
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 432 F.2d 659 (D.C.Cir. 1970). 
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 Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 661. 
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 Napalm is an aluminum-based soap which is combined with gasoline to form a syrup used in 
chemical warfare.  It was developed by Harvard University scientists during World War II in order to 
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95
 Id. at 662. 
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 Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 676 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5)). 
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The Medical Committee had submitted the 1968 version of its proposal after the 
deadline for submitting such proposals and Dow, not surprisingly, refused to include it 
in its proxy statement.99  In January 1969, having received no further communications 
from Dow, the Medical Committee re-submitted its proposal.100   After Dow notified 
the Medical Committee that it intended to omit the proposal from its proxy statement, 
the Medical Committee sought to revise the proposal.  Acknowledging that 
“management should be allowed to decide to whom and under what circumstances it 
will sell its products,” the Medical Committee nonetheless urged that “the company’s 
owners have not only the legal power but also the historic and economic obligation to 
determine what products their company will manufacture.”101  Accordingly, the Medical 
Committee enclosed a revised proposal requesting that the Board “consider the 
advisability of adopting a resolution setting forth an amendment to [Dow’s certificate of 
incorporation] that the company shall not make napalm.”102   
Dow was unmoved by the amendments and sent the SEC a memorandum stating 
its reasons for omitting the proposal.  The SEC Division of Corporation Finance granted 
a no-action letter.103  The Medical Committee duly appealed, but the full Commission 
approved the recommendation of its Division of Corporation Finance.104  The Medical 
Committee next appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.   
Given the case law since Transamerica, it was not entirely clear that the federal 
courts had jurisdiction to review SEC decisions relating to shareholder proposals, or 
that such review should occur in the Court of Appeals.105  As the court noted,106 after 
the Southern District of New York’s ruling in Peck that a shareholder must exhaust 
administrative remedies through appeal to the Commission itself before seeking review 
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in a federal court,107 shareholders would have faced quite a procedural conundrum if the 
D.C. Circuit had now ruled that exhaustion of administrative remedies barred a 
shareholder from review in a federal court.  However, the D.C. Circuit also recognized 
that there was some dicta and some scholarly comment suggesting that no-action letters 
in the shareholder proposal context were not reviewable orders.108  Still, after an 
extended discussion,109 the D.C. Circuit concluded that the SEC determination was 
reviewable110 in the Court of Appeals.111 
Having failed to persuade the Court of Appeals that it was without jurisdiction 
to review SEC decisions in such matters, the SEC nonetheless argued for a level of 
judicial deference to the SEC’s views akin to that accorded to prosecutorial 
discretion.112  The court did not feel the need to accord the SEC such deference, in large 
part because of evidence of frequent procedural irregularities in the SEC’s internal 
review of shareholder proposals.113  The most serious charge, the court noted, was “all 
too clearly illustrated by the record in the present case: the lack of articulated bases for 
past decisions encourages management to file shotgun objections to a shareholder 
proposal, urging every mildly plausible legal argument that inventive counsel can 
contrive, in the hope that the Commission will accept one of them.”114  The Court 
implied that the effect of SEC “discretion” was to dispose of controversies through 
“calculated non-decisions that will eventually cause eager supplicants to give up in 
frustration and stop ‘bothering’ the agency.”115  The court then proceeded with a limited 
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review of the SEC’s determination: “if the Commission was found to have proceeded 
on erroneous legal principles, the Commission would be ordered to proceed within the 
framework of its own discretionary authority on the indicated correct principles.”116  
Although the Court deemed it “obvious to the point of banality to restate” Congress’s 
purpose in enacting Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it nonetheless 
noted that Congress’s intent was “to give true vitality to the concept of corporate 
democracy.”117  That purpose could not possibly be frustrated by a remand to the SEC 
to articulate the grounds underlying the grant of its no-action letter. 
The court then proceeded to a discussion of the merits of the case.  As indicated 
above, Dow sought to exclude the Medical Committee’s proposal on two grounds: that 
its concerns were essentially political rather than economic and that it related to 
ordinary business operations.118  The court conceded that these two limitations on the 
corporation’s obligation to include shareholder proposals in its proxy materials were 
“on their face, consistent with the legislative purpose underlying section 14.”119  The 
court deemed it “fair to infer” that Congress would not have desired that proxy 
solicitations become a vehicle through which “malcontented shareholders [could] vent 
their spleen about irrelevant matters.”120  Congress may well also have anticipated that 
“management cannot exercise its specialized talents effectively if corporate investors 
assert the power to dictate the minutiae of daily business decisions.”121   
Still, in language that indicated a radical shift from earlier case law, the court 
acknowledged the risk that the two exclusions could be construed so as to exclude 
almost any shareholder proposal on the ground it is either too general or too specific.122  
The court found that Dow had attempted to either dash the Medical Committee’s 
proposal against the Scylla of generality or to drown it in the Charybdis of specificity 
and that the SEC had accepted Dow’s decision to exclude the proposal without even 
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identifying which of these hazards had provided the substantive ground for its 
decision.123   
With respect to the claim that the Medical Committee’s proposal was “too 
specific,” in that it related to Dow’s ordinary business operations and was thus 
excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(5), the court remarked that the scope of ordinary 
business operations was to be determined based on governing state law.124  However, 
Delaware law permits amendments to a corporation’s certificate of incorporation so as 
to “change, substitute, enlarge or diminish the nature of the” corporation’s business.125  
The court found no evidence in the record to support Dow’s contention that the proposal 
was not for a proper purpose under Delaware law.126  Departing from the reasoning of 
the Brooks court,127 the Medical Committee court criticized the SEC for its “superficial 
analysis” of applicable state law and found that the SEC had failed to comply with its 
own requirement that management sustain the burden of proof when seeking to omit a 
shareholder proposal.128  
The court characterized as “somewhat more substantial” Dow’s argument that 
the proposal could be excluded as “too general” under Rule 14a-8(c)(2), which 
permitted exclusion of proposals that are primarily political in nature.129  However, the 
court was unpersuaded by the Dow’s memorandum of counsel on the subject, which 
simply described the sorts of political protests of which Dow had been a target because 
of its government contracting in connection with the Viet Nam War and then reached 
the “abrupt conclusion” that the proposal should therefore be excluded.130  The court 
was unwilling to connect the dots and to treat the proposal as representing nothing more 
than another example of protest tactics relating to Dow’s contracts with the Department 
of Defense.   
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Here again, the court returned to Congress’s intentions in passing § 14(a) of the 
’34 Act, whose “overriding purpose” it was “to assure to corporate shareholders their 
right – some would say their duty – to control the important decisions which affect them 
in their capacity as stockholders and owners of the corporation.”131  In light of this 
congressional purpose, the court could find no reason why management should be 
permitted to “place obstacles in the path of shareholders who wish to present to their co-
owners . . . the question of whether they wish to have their assets used in a manner 
which they believe to be more socially responsible but possibly less profitable than that 
which is dictated by present company policy.”132  Moreover, in this case, there was 
ample evidence that Dow’s management was itself motivated by a political purpose and 
not by the profit motive.  According to the court, Dow’s own publications proclaimed: 
that the decision to continue manufacturing and marketing napalm was 
made not because of business considerations, but in spite of them; that 
management in essence decided to pursue a course of activity which 
generated little profit for the shareholders and actively impaired the 
company’s public relations and recruitment activities because 
management considered this action morally and politically desirable. . . .  
We think that there is a clear and compelling distinction between 
management’s legitimate need for freedom to apply its expertise in 
matters of day-to-day business judgment and management’s patently 
illegitimate claim of power to treat modern corporations with their vast 
resources as personal satrapies implementing personal political or moral 
predilections.  It could scarcely be argued that management is more 
qualified or more entitled to make these kinds of decisions than the 
shareholders who are the true beneficial owners of the corporation.133  
Not only did the court think that the corporation had not born its burden under the 
SEC’s regulations, it also asserted that the regulations – at least as applied in this case – 
could not be harmonized with Congress’s intent in adopting § 14(a) of the ’34 Act.134  
The case was remanded to the SEC for reconsideration in light of the court’s 
opinion and with instructions that the basis for the SEC’s decision must appear in the 
record “not in conclusory terms but in sufficient detail to permit prompt and effective 
review.”135  The SEC was sufficiently concerned about the consequences of the decision 
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to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.136  However, before the 
Court could decide the case, Dow included the proposal in its annual proxy materials, 
and it received votes from less than 3% of the shares that participated.137  The Supreme 
Court reasoned that, given this meager support for the proposal, Dow may decide to 
include it if it were re-submitted in the future rather than litigate.138  The facts thus no 
longer presented an active case or controversy, and the case was dismissed as moot.139  
The status of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was thus unclear. 
C. The Effect of Medical Committee 
In the aftermath of Medical Committee, the number of shareholder proposals 
increased dramatically, as did the number of proposals relating to social issues.140  In 
addition, the SEC for the first time revised the Rule in a way that restricted the ability of 
management to exclude such proposals from its proxy materials.  In 1972, the SEC 
revised the portion of the Rule relating to the exclusion of social proposals, permitting 
the exclusion of proposals only if they were not “significantly related to the issuer’s 
business or within its control.”141  In 1976, the SEC again revised the Rule, eliminating 
all reference to social or political proposals.142   
As we shall see, the Medical Committee opinion influenced Peter Lovenheim to 
become a shareholder activist.  He was not alone.  Between 1976 and 1983, social 
proposals accounted for  over 20% of all proposals received each year by the American 
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Society of Corporate Secretaries.143  However, after a 1983 revision of the Rule that 
required a proponent to own $1000 worth of stock in the issuer, the number of social 
proposals dropped by more than half.144 
II.      FAIR IS FOWL: THE STORY OF LOVENHEIM V. IROQUOIS 
BRANDS  
Peter Lovenheim was something of an amateur investor.  When he found out 
about a company that he liked, he would buy shares.  In the fall of 1981, he bought 200 
shares of the common stock of Iroquois145 on the advice of his fiancée, who was a 
nutritionist,146 and had recommended the Schiff line of vitamins that Iroquois 
distributed.147  Lovenheim also saw potential for Iroquois’ stock “because of its 
involvement in the expanding market for health foods and natural foods.”148  Within a 
few months of purchasing his Iroquois stock, Lovenheim received proxy materials from 
which he learned that Iroquois marketed Eduard Artnzer pâté de foie gras, in the United 
States.149  Foie gras is a gourmet food produced from the livers of domesticated geese 
raised on a carbohydrate-rich diet.150   
A.      What’s Good for the Goose: Lovenheim’s First 
Shareholder Proposal 
Lovenheim had originally been attracted to Iroquois because the corporation 
marketed products that promoted healthy lifestyles.151  He did not think that 
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encouraging the consumption of pâté de foie gras was consistent with the rest of 
Iroquois’ product lines, nor did he think that other like-minded shareholders would want 
Iroquois to be involved in the distribution of pâté de foie gras if the production of the 
product involved significant animal cruelty.152 Although Lovenheim was working at the 
Humane Society at the time of the lawsuit153 and was described in the press as “an 
animal rights activist,”154 he would later describe himself as someone who did some 
work for the Humane Society when he was just out of school but was not “an animal 
rights person.”155  Lovenheim was not a strict vegetarian.156 
The corporation’s view of itself was very different from the way Lovenheim 
understood it.  Although it did market natural foods and vitamins as two of its product 
lines, those product lines were by no means central to the corporation’s mission or 
identity.  Iroquois started out as a brewery and, at the time Lovenheim invested, 
distributed many diverse product lines, ranging from Champale to Yoohoo, through 
numerous subsidiaries.157 
According to Lovenheim, the process of force-feeding usually begins when the 
birds are four months old.  At farms at which the process has been mechanized, the 
birds are placed in a metal brace and the neck is stretched so that a funnel may be 
inserted 10-12 inches down the bird’s throat.  400 grams of corn mash are then pumped 
into the birds’ stomachs, while an elastic band around its neck prevents regurgitation.  
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Where the process is done by hand, the feeder uses a funnel and a stick to force the 
mash down the bird’s throat.158  The birds are force fed for between 15 and 28 days, and 
shortly thereafter they are slaughtered.159  During the brief period of force-feeding, the 
geese double their weight, but their livers swell until they account for up to ten percent 
of the bird’s total weight.  An ordinary goose liver weighs about 120 grams; the liver of 
a force-fed bird weighs between 800 and 1000 grams.160  Up to 10% of the birds die 
before they can be slaughtered as a result of the forced feeding.161 
On May 10, 1982, Lovenheim wrote to Iroquois’ management and requested 
that it look into the possibility that the pâté product that it was distributing was 
produced through forced-feeding of geese.162   The corporation did not respond to that 
letter or to subsequent communications,163 so on December 14, 1982, Lovenheim, on 
his own behalf and on behalf of the Humane Society, wrote a letter to Terence J. Fox, 
the president of Iroquois, enclosing a shareholder proposal for inclusion in the 
company’s proxy materials for action at the next Iroquois annual shareholder meeting to 
be held in May 1983.164   The letter stated that the proposal was prepared in accordance 
with the relevant regulations promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.165  Lovenheim also notified the corporation that he intended to attend the 
annual shareholder meeting.166 
Under the regulations operative at the time, Lovenheim was eligible to submit a 
proposal based on his ownership of 200 shares of stock in the corporation for at least 
one year prior to the shareholder meeting.167  Lovenheim’s proposal noted that Iroquois 
“strives to maintain a reputation as a distributor of wholesome foods” and characterized 
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the proposal as seeking “to assure that Iroquois Brands, Ltd. is not inadvertently 
promoting cruelty to animals and does not risk damaging its reputation as a distributor 
of wholesome foods.”168  The proposal then asked the corporation to: 
form a committee to study the methods by which its French supplier 
produces pâté de foie gras, and report to the shareholders its findings and 
opinions, based on expert consultation, on whether this production 
method causes undue distress, pain or suffering to the animals involved 
and, if so, whether further distribution of this product should be 
discontinued until a more humane production method is developed.169 
The proposal indicates how, notwithstanding Medical Committee, shareholders still had 
to steer between the Scylla of generality and the Charybdis of specificity.    
Presumably, Lovenheim knew or suspected that pâté de foie gras is always 
produced through the force-feeding of geese, and he really wanted Iroquois to stop 
distributing the product because its distribution encouraged what he considered a form 
of animal cruelty.  But under the SEC rules operative at the time, shareholders could not 
bring proposals relating to the continuation of a particular product, as control over 
ordinary business operations was entrusted to management alone.170  Nor could 
Lovenheim bring a proposal that simply denounced animal cruelty and demanded that 
Iroquois adopt a position consistent with his ethical objections to inhumane treatment of 
animals without running afoul of the SEC regulation intended to prevent the shareholder 
proposal from being abused as a mechanism of general political protest.171  As a result, 
the shareholder proposal has a bit of absurdist theater about it.  Proposals must ask the 
board to form a committee to investigate a matter and make recommendations.172  That 
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way, the shareholder does not interfere with the conduct of ordinary business 
operations, as the final decision is left in the discretion of the board. 
The corporation responded with a letter from Iroquois’ General Counsel 
requesting certification of the number of shares owned by Mr. Lovenheim and the 
Humane Society.173  Lovenheim got back to Iroquois just five days later, providing 
certification of the shares owned by the Humane Society.   As the SEC regulations did 
not require him to state the quantity of shares owned by a person bringing a shareholder 
proposal, Lovenheim pointed out that he did not need to provide the certification 
requested, but he did state that he had owned 200 shares Iroquois common stock since 
1981.174 
The corporation had no further objection to Lovenheim’s proposal.  It included 
the proposal in the proxy materials distributed in advance of its May 1983 shareholder 
meeting.175   It also included its own recommendation that shareholders vote against 
Lovenheim’s proposal.  While noting that the corporation “deplores cruelty to animals 
in any form and commends the Humane Society of the United States for the important 
work it does to alleviate such practices,”176 management gave the following reasons for 
its opposition: (1) Iroquois exercised no control over the production of the French pâté; 
(2) the product is tested and approved by the Federal Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA); (3) it is unnecessary to form a panel of directors to study an issue over which 
the board has no control; and (4) the product in question “represents an infinitely small 
percent of Iroquois’ sale and profits” – in fact the expert consultation called for in the 
proposal would entail costs in excess of the expected profitability of the product.177 
As he stated he would, Lovenheim appeared at that annual shareholder meeting 
and presented his proposal.178  In his presentation, Lovenheim offered a point-by-point 
refutation of management’s arguments.  He pointed out that FDA regulation does not 
encompass any test for humane treatment.  “You can import brains pulled from the 
skulls of live dogs, and the FDA would accept it for importation,” Lovenheim noted.179  
Lovenheim next noted that it simply was not true that Iroquois had no control over the 
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production of the product, since consumers can always pressure producers to change 
their production processes.180  Lovenheim also addressed management’s concerns about 
the cost of expert consultation on the matter by pointing out that the experts in question 
would likely be academics, who do not charge much for their services.  If the charges 
proved excessive, Lovenheim offered, the Humane Society would provide expert 
consultations at no cost.181  Finally, Lovenheim urged shareholders’ to reject 
management’s position that humane treatment of animals was simply too costly.   “I say 
that if an investigation would cost too much, then we should stop selling the product, or 
if we are to continue selling the product, then we should have the investigation.”182   
Another shareholder then rose in support of Lovenheim’s proposal.183  In the ensuing 
vote, Lovenheim’s proposal garnered 50,000 votes, just over 5% of those cast.184 
B.      The Goose Chase: From Proponent to Litigant 
Encouraged by this result, Lovenheim offered the same resolution the following 
year.185   He wrote well in advance to seek information regarding the date for the 
upcoming shareholder meeting.186  To Lovenheim’s surprise, the company responded 
this time by notifying him (through corporate counsel) that Iroquois considered the 
proposal excludable.187   During the intervening year, the SEC had again revised its 
regulations.188   
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The SEC now required shareholders to own at least one percent or $1000 worth 
of the corporation’s stock for at least one year prior to the submission of the proposal.189  
In addition, the rules now permitted exclusion of proposals relating to business 
operations accounting for less than five percent of the issuer’s total assets and for less 
than five percent of net earnings and gross sales and not otherwise significantly related 
to the issuer's business.190  Thus, when Lovenheim submitted his proposal in 1983, 
which was virtually identical to the one submitted one year earlier, Iroquois’ only 
response was to copy him on a letter to the SEC, which stated its intention to omit the 
proposal from its proxy statement on the ground that it related “to operations which 
account for less than 5 percent of [Iroquois’] total assets . . . and less than 5 percent of 
its net earnings and gross sales . . . and is not otherwise significantly related to” 
Iroquois’ business.191  
However, as Lovenheim pointed out in his responsive memorandum of law, 
Iroquois thus did nothing more than re-state the purportedly applicable SEC rule.192  
Such a simple assertion was not sufficient to meet the corporation’s burden, said 
Lovenheim, under the applicable federal regulations.193  In any case, Lovenheim 
argued, even if it were true that the product at issue did not constitute five percent of 
Iroquois’ assets, earnings or sales, Iroquois could not show that the product was not 
“otherwise significantly related” to its business.194 Setting aside the broader social 
importance of animal cruelty, Lovenheim argued that, given that Iroquois was a health 
food company, whose major product lines included natural vitamins, herb teas and other 
natural foods that did not include any animal products in their ingredients, the proposal 
was significantly related to Iroquois’ economic interests.195  This was especially so, 
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Lovenheim contended, because consumers of health food and natural food products are 
more likely to value humane treatment of animals than is the general public.196  
Lovenheim cited to Iroquois’ advertisements of its products in magazines such as 
Vegetarian Times and Prevention, both of which clearly were marketed towards 
audiences concerned about animal cruelty.197 
Finally, Lovenheim argued that the SEC, in using the phrase “significantly 
related” in the relevant regulation, did not mean to permit corporations to omit 
proposals that related to significant social and ethical issues.198  The Commission 
recognized that there are many instances in which the matter involved in a proposal is 
significant to an issuer’s business, even though such significance is not apparent from 
an economic viewpoint.199   
Addressing none of the legal arguments and factual claims in Lovenheim’s 20-
page memorandum, the SEC sided with Iroquois in a two-paragraph no-action letter.200  
The SEC simply noted that “[t]here appears to be some basis for your opinion that the 
proposal may be omitted from the Company’s proxy material under Rule 14a-8(c)(5)” 
and concluded that there would be no enforcement action if the Lovenheim proposal 
were omitted from Iroquois’ proxy materials.201  
Lovenheim appealed the decision of the Division of Corporation Finance to the 
SEC’s five commissioners.202  His memorandum of law submitted to the commissioners 
rehearsed the arguments from his earlier memorandum, which it incorporated by 
reference203 and made the additional argument that the proposal was not new and had 
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won more than five percent of votes cast at the 1983 shareholder meeting.204  The 
Commission declined review.205   
Lovenheim attempted to settle his differences with the corporation in advance of 
the annual shareholder meeting.  He offered to drop the shareholder proposal if Iroquois 
would simply agree to set up a committee to investigate the methods used for the 
manufacture of the pâté distributed by the corporation.206   Lovenheim recommended 
that three members of the animal protection community serve as ex officio members of 
the committee: one representative from American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Animals, one representative from the Humane Society and Lovenheim himself.207   
Iroquois was not receptive to such a settlement.208   
Lovenheim was undeterred.  In fact, the SEC’s casual, unreflective decision 
denying review of his appeal of the SEC staff’s issuance of a no-action letter infuriated 
and inspired him.209  He prepared his shareholder proposal for a third time.  On October 
17, 1984, he sent the proposal for inclusion in Iroquois’ 1985 proxy statement.210  Once 
again, Iroquois responded with a letter to the SEC stating its intention to omit 
Lovenheim’s proposal from its proxy materials.211  This time, the corporation took the 
trouble to present some statistics, indicating that the pâté at issue accounted for less than 
0.05% of the corporation’s sales, less than 0.3% of its net earnings and less than 0.09% 
of its assets for 1982 and 1983, statistics not expected to change significantly in 1984.212  
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On January 9, 1985, The SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance once again issued a 
response to Iroquois, stating that it would not recommend any enforcement action if 
Iroquois were to omit Lovenheim’s proposal from its proxy materials.213 
C.      Iroquois’ Goose Is Cooked in the D.C. District Court 
As a relatively recent law graduate, Lovenheim still had a fresh recollection of 
Medical Committee.214 In Lovenheim’s view, that decision compelled a ruling in his 
case obligating Iroquois to distribute his proposal, because it raised a socially 
significant issue that was related to Iroquois’ business.  So Lovenheim bypassed an 
appeal to the SEC commissioners and filed suit in the D.C. District Court215 seeking an 
injunction ordering Iroquois to distribute his proposal.216  This time, he retained 
Jonathan Eisenberg, an experienced attorney who agreed to work pro bono and to help 
him on the brief submitted in support of his suit for injunctive relief.217  Lovenheim’s 
motivation in skipping review by the Commission may have been in the interests of 
saving time and resources.  It also may have been strategic, since at oral argument in the 
District Court, his counsel argued that the court owed no deference to a decision by the 
SEC’s staff to issue a no-action letter.218  It may well have proved harder to persuade 
the court that it owed no deference to the SEC’s Commissioners’ interpretation of the 
agency’s own rules. 
Jonathan Eisenberg acknowledged during oral argument that Lovenheim did not 
bring the proposal because he expected it to win a majority of the shareholder vote.219  
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Rather, the purpose was to “force management to take a hard look at the conduct they 
are engaged in” and to “ask themselves whether they can defend that” conduct.220 
Eisenberg contended that the effectiveness of this tactic was evidenced by the fact that 
in 1982 32 shareholder proposals had been withdrawn as moot, suggesting that the 
corporations chose to adopt the measures proposed rather than put them to a shareholder 
vote.221  Eisenberg reminded the court that the proposal had won five percent of the 
shareholder vote when it had been included in Iroquois’ 1983 proxy materials and stated 
that if the proposal were again included, he believed there to be “a significant chance” 
that Iroquois would decide to discontinue distribution of the product.222 
On the law, Eisenberg encouraged the court to consider the relevant regulation, 
14a-8(c)(5), as constituting a two-part test, both of which have to be met for the 
corporation to be permitted to exclude a proposal.223  Lovenheim did not challenge 
Iroquois’ claim that the economic portion of 14a-8(c)(5) was met,224 but Eisenberg 
stressed that in 1976 the SEC re-wrote the regulation, removing language that permitted 
the corporation to omit a proposal “if it is submitted primarily for general political, 
social ends” and adding language permitting omission of proposals that are not 
economically significant and “that are not significantly related to the issuer’s 
business.”225   
The effect of the change was, in Eisenberg’s view, to eliminate from the SEC’s 
regulation any indication that social proposals “were suspect.”226  Since the 1976 
changes, the SEC had required that all social proposals be included so long as the 
issuer’s business was in any way implicated in the proposal.227  Eisenberg’s argument 
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suggests that the SEC learned from Medical Committee and sought to avoid a head-on 
collision with the judiciary over whether or not it could permit exclusion of social 
proposals without undermining Congress’s intent in passing Section 14(a) of the ’34 
Act.228   
The requirement that the proposal be significantly related was met here, 
Eisenberg contended, because Iroquois made $70,000 worth of sales in pâté de foie 
gras.229  If the issue was significant and the corporation were doing even “one 
completely outrageous thing a year,” Eisenberg maintained, the corporation could not 
refuse to include a proposal relating to that conduct on the ground that it was not 
“economically significant,” in that the conduct did not relate to five percent of the 
corporation’s assets.230  
Counsel for Iroquois stressed that the connection between the issue raised by the 
proposal and Iroquois’ business was “de minimis,” and that the SEC could not possibly 
have intended to require corporations to include in proxy statements every single social 
proposal that had any conceivable connection to the corporation’s operations.231 Pâté de 
foie gras accounted for only a tiny portion of Iroquois’ business.  According to the 
affidavit of its president, Iroquois had annual revenues of $141 million, $6 million in 
annual profits and $78 million in assets.  Its sales of pâté amounted to just $79,000, 
resulting in a net loss of $3,121.  The company valued its total assets related to pâté at 
$34,000.232  Accordingly, Iroquois thought it was well within its rights under the 
relevant SEC rule to deny Lovenheim’s request. 
Iroquois argued, in essence, that the main point of 14a-8(c)(5) was to make 
certain that proposals relate to significant portions of the issuer’s business, even if they 
raise significant political, social or ethical issues.233 Corporations are business entities.  
They and the SEC are primarily interested in economic matters, Iroquois argued, with 
respect to proxy statements as in all other areas.234  Medical Committee, as Iroquois 
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understood it, stood only for the proposition that a corporation may not exclude a 
proposal simply on the ground that it raises political issues.  The opinion did not require 
the inclusion of proposals that are of no real economic significance to the 
corporation.235 
The court sided with Lovenheim on the decisive point.  Although Medical 
Committee was decided under an earlier version of the Rule and the economic 
significance of Dow’s production of napalm was not an issue in the case, the court 
noted that the D.C. Circuit, in deciding Medical Committee, had assumed that “napalm 
was not economically significant to Dow.”236  After a brief review of the Rule, the court 
concluded that there was simply no evidence that the SEC intended to limit its 
understanding of the “significance” of a proposal to economic criteria, as Iroquois 
suggested it should.237  The court recognized the social significance of Lovenheim’s 
proposal and the fact that it “implicate[d] significant levels of sales” for Iroquois.238  It 
therefore granted Lovenheim the injunctive relief he sought.239 
The court’s factual findings were significant.  The evidence cited in the opinion 
for the social significance for Lovenheim’s proposal was limited to a footnote making 
reference to Lovenheim’s brief.240  Lovenheim had argued that humane treatment of 
animals is a “foundation of western culture.”   In support of this argument, he cited the 
Seven Laws of Noah,241 as well as animal protection statutes beginning with one 
enacted by the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641.  By the time of the litigation, such 
statutes had been enacted in all fifty states.242   
A court might have considered such evidence as strikingly weak, as none of it 
specifically addressed a state interest in regulating the force-feeding of geese.243  At the 
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time the case was decided, Lovenheim could not have cited to a single federal, state or 
locality that had attempted to regulate the force-feeding of geese.244  Indeed, at oral 
argument, Iroquois’ counsel made the policy argument that corporations should not 
have to decide “which issues are sufficiently important to be put to the shareholders on 
philosophical and ethical terms and which issues are not.”245  Iroquois’ counsel 
obviously thought that the issue of force-feeding of geese in France was not 
significant,246 a view apparently shared by “proxy resolution afficianados.”247  Even 
Lovenheim’s counsel came very close to conceding that the issue was not as significant 
as the use of napalm raised in Medical Committee.248  Neither party offered expert 
testimony on the political social or ethical significance of the issue.  One is hard pressed 
to imagine where such expertise would reside or why it should reside in a corporation, 
in the SEC or in a court. 249  Determining which issues are “important” is not within the 
institutional competence of any of those bodies.250 
Leaving significance aside, there was also the question of what constitutes 
“significantly related” to the business operations of the issuer.   Lovenheim’s counsel 
offered that a proposal advocating that the corporation cease doing business in South 
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Africa would be excludable if the corporation did not in fact do business there and that a 
proposal like Lovenheim’s would not have to be submitted to the shareholders of IBM 
if IBM did not import pâté de foie gras.251  But Iroquois counsel countered that “clever 
and imaginative lawyers will always be able to think of some tenuous link to the 
business of the corporation.”252 A shareholder might argue that there is a significant 
relation between IBM’s business operations and pâté de foie gras if it offers the delicacy 
for purchase in its employee cafeteria once a month.253  In Eisenberg’s response, he 
simply pointed out that there had as yet arisen no problem with IBM shareholders using 
proposals to object to the items on the menu in the employee cafeteria.254 
Nor is the basis clear for the court’s finding that sales of pâté de foie gras 
“implicated significant levels of sales” for Iroquois Brands.  The court had earlier noted 
that, because sales of pâté de foie gras accounted for only $34,000 of the company’s 
assets, and that sales of pâté de foie gras had resulted in a net loss, the proposal 
implicated “none of the company’s net earnings and less than 0.05% of its assets.”255  In 
a footnote, the court noted that the result in the case would have been different if the 
proposal had no “meaningful relationship to the business of” the corporation.256  Still, 
the court’s willingness to accept as socially significant any proposal relating to a subject 
about which some national non-profit organizations had expressed concern, coupled 
with its willingness to think it significantly related to a business if it accounts for 0.05% 
of a corporations’ assets, suggested that corporations could be obligated to distribute 
shareholder proposals on nearly any subject that in any way related to their businesses. 
There was a great deal of media interest in the case, with articles appearing in 
The Washington Post,257 The Los Angeles Times,258 and The Wall Street Journal,259 
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among other newspapers.260  The Washington Post was especially vocal in its support 
for Lovenheim’s brand of shareholder activism: “There isn’t a company in the country 
that couldn’t benefit from 10 tough questions from stockholders at its annual meeting 
this year.  But there probably isn’t one company in 10 that will face them.”261  Given 
the timing of the opinion, Iroquois had to acquiesce, as there was insufficient time to 
appeal the decision before the next annual shareholder meeting,262 which was held just 
weeks after the District Court’s decision.263 
Lovenheim attended the meeting, as required under the regulations, and he 
presented his proposal to the shareholders and their proxies.  The reception was far from 
warm.264 Lovenheim’s proposal received less than eight percent of the votes cast by 
Iroquois’ shareholders.265  As a result, Iroquois would not be required to include 
Lovenheim’s proposal or another proposal on the same subject matter for three years.266  
Despite the court victory and the publicity, ordinary shareholders were unmoved.267  Or 
were they?  Within months of the shareholder meeting, Iroquois sold the unit 
responsible for importing pâté de foie gras, announcing that it now considered the issue 
put behind the company.268   
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Lovenheim comes on the tail end of a period in the history of shareholder 
proposals when individual shareholders were the dominant shareholder activists.269  In 
the 1980s, institutional investors, first church groups and then pension funds, began to 
play a leading role in promulgating shareholder proposals.270  Lovenheim is a 
paradigmatic transitional case because, although Peter Lovenheim brought his proposal 
in his own behalf, he also did so on behalf of the Humane Society of the United 
States.271  Moreover, Lovenheim worked closely with organizations opposed to animal 
cruelty in attempting to use his shareholder proposal as part of a broader strategy to 
persuade Iroquois to stop marketing pâté de foie gras.  His case suggests the difficulties 
an individual investor might face in trying to put pressure on a corporation through the 
mechanism of the shareholder proposal and thus illustrates why the transition from 
individual shareholder activists to institutional activism might have occurred. 
D. Lovenheim’s Further Adventures in Animal Law 
After his experience with Iroquois, Lovenheim, having returned to his native 
Rochester, began offering his services as a sort of freelance drafter of shareholder 
proposals for non-profit organizations.272  He worked with People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (PETA), and helped them start an ongoing program aimed at 
bringing animal protection issues to the attention of corporations through shareholder 
proposals.273  Lovenheim also teamed up with Henry Spira, a brilliant tactician in the art 
of “constructive shaming,” which involves pressuring corporations into cooperating 
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with advocates for the ethical treatment of animals.274  Spira’s biographer, Peter Singer, 
describes him as follows: 
Henry Spira [was] a bushy-haired New York high school teacher who 
spoke with a broad accent that came from years spent on ships as a sailor 
in the merchant marine and on the General Motors assembly line in New 
Jersey.  [Revlon’s vice president for investor relations, Roger] Shelley 
saw that Henry’s clothes were crumpled, that he rarely wore a tie, and 
that when he did, he seemed incapable of getting it to meet his collar.  
But that wasn’t all that Shelley noticed: “There was not one ounce of 
product on his body that was produced by an animal and that included 
his belt, that included shoes, that included everything . . . Here was a 
man who did what he said he would do.”275 
Singer chronicles Spira’s career as an advocate for animals.  From 1975-77, Spira 
organized a campaign to end animal experimentation at New York’s Museum of 
Natural History.276  Spira and his colleagues not only highlighted the suffering of the 
animals that were the subject of the experiments277 in the museum, they were also able 
to show that the research was more or less useless.278  The museum closed and 
dismantled its laboratories.279 
Spira next pressured Amnesty International into ceasing its support for a group 
of scientists that was torturing pigs in order to learn whether torture could be conducted 
without leaving visible traces.280  There followed a successful campaign to repeal New 
York’s Metcalf-Hatch Act, which allowed medical researchers to seize unclaimed dogs 
and cats from animal shelters.281  Spira then launched a series of campaigns against 
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corporations engaged in inhumane treatment of animals, including: a largely successful 
campaign to get Revlon to develop new ways to test eye irritancy and thus to stop 
blinding rabbits in order to test the safety of its products;282 a campaign that greatly 
reduced the use of a brutal product safety process, LD50, which involves determining 
the dose at which a substance is lethal to 50% of the animals tested;283 and a far less 
successful effort to expose inhumane treatment of chickens by the Perdue Farms 
corporation.284 
Spira next teamed up with Temple Grandin, a designer of livestock handling 
facilities and a Professor of Animal Science at Colorado State University, to replace the 
“shackle and hoist” method for the ritual slaughter of cattle with a more humane upright 
restraining system that Grandin designed.285  There followed an equally successful 
campaign to end the USDA’s policy of face-branding Mexican cattle.286  Aiming at a 
larger impact on the farm animal industry, Spira next targeted McDonald’s.287  While 
Spira’s usual strategy was to take out full-page ads in major newspapers illustrating 
animal cruelty and thus to use the threat of adverse publicity to bring corporations to the 
table, with Lovenheim’s assistance, he supplemented that tactic with a shareholder 
proposal, calling on McDonald’s to form a committee to investigate the effect of factory 
farming on animals used in McDonald’s food products.288 
Together, Lovenheim and Spira were able to persuade McDonald’s to adopt 
three basic principles to help assure humane treatment of the animals used in 
McDonald’s products.289  In the several years Lovenheim worked with Spira, he claims 
they never had to actually bring a proposal to a vote in a shareholder meeting.  Spira 
had won a reputation for openness to reasonable compromise.  He worked with 
corporations until they agreed to adopt measures that would enhance their reputations 
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for corporate responsibility.  The result was almost invariably at least a partial adoption 
of the substance of the proposals that Spira and Lovenheim brought.290 
Lovenheim’s story thus suggests that shareholder proposals have consequences 
that go beyond their effects on the corporation to which the proposal originally relates.  
Peter Lovenheim began as an amateur investor, who chose to put a relatively small 
amount of money into corporations in which he believed.  He then learned that one of 
those corporations was engaged in a business practice of which he disapproved and 
which he considered inconsistent with the business model that had led him to invest in 
the first place.  He raised his voice, but both the corporation and the SEC would not 
hear his complaints.  This response turned Lovenheim into a litigant and, briefly, in to 
an activist.  He shared his expertise in writing shareholder proposals with others who 
shared his political goals.  And one thing led to another.  For a time at least, Peter 
Lovenheim was transformed by his experience as a proponent into someone who 
worked with other to promote social change through mechanisms that were not limited 
to the shareholder proposal mechanism.   
III. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND THE SEPARATION OF 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
Lovenheim and Medical Committee illustrate the determination and resolve 
required of any shareholder who wants to get a proposal before the shareholders of a 
corporation.  In both cases, the proponents of the proposal either represented or had the 
strong, active support of an organization.  Lovenheim was an attorney who was not 
intimidated by the procedural hurdles shareholders face, but he was exceptional.  It is in 
fact very rare – and it was even more rare at the time of Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands – 
for disappointed proponents to challenge no-action letters.291   Up until 1990, there were 
only 13 reported cases reviewing SEC determinations on shareholder proposals.292  As 
the Medical Committee court noted, the SEC’s process for reviewing proposals was far 
from transparent and often resulted in corporations being permitted to omit proposals 
for reasons that were not effectively communicated to the proponents of those 
proposals.293 
For opponents of shareholder proposals, the fact that the proponent in Medical 
Committee was an organization that promoted social causes and that Lovenheim had 
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close ties with such an organization highlights the problem of shareholder social 
proposals.  Opponents of shareholder proposals view shareholders primarily as passive 
investors seeking an economic return.294  So viewed, their only interest in political or 
social issues ought to be with the effect of such issues on the return on their investment 
in the corporation.  As one critic of the Rule put it: “Stockholder participatory 
democracy is a myth; investors do not buy stock in public companies with any serious 
expectation of influencing management.  The Wall Street Rule is the only practical rule 
by which sensible investors are governed.  Small investors who do not like management 
sell their shares.”295  If the issue is essentially an economic one, say the social proposal 
skeptics, then it ought to be left for corporate managers to decide in the exercise of their 
business judgment.296  If the issue is not economic, then it has no business being before 
any corporate body. 
Lovenheim conceded that his proposal was likely to fail and that, even if it 
passed it would require only that the corporation form a committee to study the methods 
used in the production of pâté de foie gras and to make recommendations for further 
distribution of the product in light of its findings.297 The Lovenheim court made clear 
that the proposal’s poor prospects for success did not excuse the corporation from its 
obligation to distribute the proposal.298  It is hard to imagine why the SEC would have 
intended to permit corporate resources to be utilized in such a way.  And yet, in the two 
decades since Lovenheim was decided, neither Congress nor the SEC has taken action to 
reign in social proposals.  On the contrary, the SEC routinely cites to Lovenheim in 
denying no-action letters to corporations.299  This final section offers an explanation of 
why that is the case. 
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A.      The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Proposals 
In connection with its 1984 revisions to Rule 14a-8, the SEC circulated a 
questionnaire in order to gauge interested parties’ attitudes towards shareholder 
proposals.  Nearly three of four respondents agreed or strongly agreed that shareholder 
proposals are “a waste of management’s time and [the] corporation’s money.”300  Most 
respondents did not agree that proposals are an efficient or effective outlet for 
concerned shareholders, although the votes were more evenly split on whether the 
proposals are an “effective way of keeping management aware of shareholder 
concerns.”301   
Although corporation counsel tend to regard shareholder proposals as a 
nuisance,302 the overall costs associated with such proposals do not seem to be that 
significant.303  One scholar estimated the total cost at about $15 million/year as of 
1992.304 In 1975-76, AT&T estimated that it spent $112,450 in including five proposals 
in its proxy materials, while it spent $41,140 on eleven others that it omitted.305 A 1981 
survey of 18 major corporations indicated an average cost of $94,775 per proposal 
submitted.306  In the past two years, the SEC has responded to between 300 and 450 
requests for no action letters each year.307  Around the time of the Lovenheim case, the 
SEC reported that it devoted only 1208 staff hours per year to the review of shareholder 
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proposals and requests for no-action letters, a rough equivalent to the time of one full-
time employee.308  And subsequent to that report, the Rule was amended309 to require 
that proponents own significant amounts of stock for one year before submitting their 
proposal, thus eliminating the danger that proponents with no real interest in the 
corporation abuse the shareholder proposal mechanism in order to get their ideas before 
millions of investors at the corporation’s expense.310  Even the most determined 
opponents of the proposal concede that its costs both to corporations and to the SEC are 
not very significant.311 
As Lovenheim understood at the outset, shareholder proposals can succeed in 
affecting corporate policy even if they do not come close to winning the shareholder 
votes necessary for adoption.  They thus can be a highly effective way to persuade 
corporate management to adopt socially responsible positions.  From a policy 
perspective, the costs of shareholder proposals to the SEC and to corporations thus 
should be balanced against the possible benefits that derive from such proposals.  The 
best evidence that such benefits exist is that numerous ideas for reform of corporate 
management originated in shareholder proposals but have been subsequently adopted 
and implemented by management.312  Because proponents benefit corporations and their 
fellow shareholders, SEC rules that force corporations to bear the costs of such 
proposals make sense.  Without them, because proponents of such proposals do not 
benefit in a manner that is proportionate to their contribution of time and effort,313 
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shareholders would not be adequately incentivized to bring potentially beneficial 
proposals.314  Viewed from this perspective, the Wall Street Rule is inefficient.  
Proponents with ideas about how to improve corporations are a resource to the 
corporation.  If their main recourse is to invest elsewhere, the corporation’s resources 
are dissipated. 
One scholar has characterized the Rule as a tax imposed on corporations that 
pays for a useful mechanism of corporate governance.315  Corporations may well regard 
this “tax” as cheaper and less onerous than government regulation.316  Shareholder 
proposals facilitate communication between a corporation’s management and its owners 
in a manner that is more open, clear and specific than any other mechanism for 
communication between management and shareholders. 
B. The Efficacy of Shareholder Proposals 
Justifications for the existence of shareholder proposals relating to social issues 
come in two varieties.  One variety focuses on the nature of corporations.   It views 
shareholders not as passive investors but as owners, who have – and should have – an 
interest in the social and political impact of a corporation.317  From this perspective, 
shareholders have not only a right but a duty to try to influence corporate management 
to adopt socially responsible policies.  In the years following the Medical Committee 
decision, scholars found ample evidence that corporations were adopting policies on 
social issues that were either directly or at least apparently stimulated by shareholder 
proposals.318  
The other variety is Melvin Eisenberg’s safety valve theory; that is, the idea that 
shareholder proposals provide a useful safety valve in that they permit shareholders to 
raise their concerns before management and their fellow shareholders in a public forum 
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in which the corporation’s leadership must provide some sort of response.319  As 
indicated above,320 the safety valve comes at relatively low cost to the corporation.321 
But both varieties of defenses of the shareholder proposal process ultimately 
sound in a theory of the corporation that recognizes that corporations have a role in 
society that is too large to be reduced to economics.  Even those who continue to 
maintain that corporations exist “primarily to earn a profit for [their] shareholders,”322 
acknowledge that the law now recognizes “a greatly enlarged social duty and 
responsibility of businesses” to care for the “comfort, health and well-being of their 
employees.”323  In fact, corporations’ social duty extends well beyond the well-being of 
their employees, and there is actually very little support, either in case law or in statutes, 
for the notion that corporations exist primarily for the benefit of their shareholders.324  
Rather, corporate management is permitted to justify its decisions not only with 
reference to shareholder interests, but also with reference to the interests of other 
stakeholders, which may include the interests of creditors, employees, customers, the 
industry as a whole or even the community at large.325   
The case that best illustrates this principle is Shlensky v. Wrigley,326 in which 
minority owners in the corporation that owned the Chicago Cubs brought suit alleging 
that the corporation’s directors had breached their duty of care by refusing to install 
lights at Wrigley Field.327  The shareholders were armed with evidence that the 
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introduction of night games would boost attendance at Cubs games, since they could 
show that the White Sox drew more fans at night games on days when the Cubs played 
day games, but the teams attracted roughly equal crowds when both played day 
games.328  The President of the corporation, Philip K. Wrigley,329 offered two reasons 
for refusing to install lights: his belief that baseball is a daytime sport; and his concern 
about the effect of lights and night baseball on the surrounding neighborhood.330  The 
court permitted the corporation to place its commitment to certain ethical or aesthetic 
principles (“baseball is a daytime sport”) and to the Wrigleyville neighborhood ahead of 
the economic interests of its shareholders. 
The law on corporate charitable giving is consistent with this expansive 
understanding of the purpose of corporations. Corporations are permitted to make 
charitable donations without any sort of requirement that they justify those donations in 
economic terms.331  In the landmark case, A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court enthusiastically embraced the principle that corporations must 
supplement their wealth maximizing pursuits with a sense of their social and ethical 
responsibility to be good corporate citizens. 
When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the hands of individuals 
they discharged their responsibilities as citizens by donating freely for 
charitable purposes. With the transfer of most of the wealth to corporate 
hands and the imposition of heavy burdens of individual taxation, they 
have been unable to keep pace with increased philanthropic needs. They 
have therefore, with justification, turned to corporations to assume the 
modern obligations of good citizenship in the same manner as humans 
do.332 
The court noted that its understanding of the need for corporate social responsibility 
was shared by Congress and state legislatures which had enacted statutes to encourage 
corporations to make charitable contributions.333  At the time Barlow was decided, 29 
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states had passed statutes permitting corporations to make charitable contributions.334  
The Model Business Corporations Act recognizes that corporations have the same 
power as an individual to do “all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business 
and affairs, including without limitation power: . . . to make donations for the public 
welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.”335  
The Rule and the SEC’s permissive approach to social proposals are 
understandable in light of the broader doctrine of corporate purposes.  Corporations do 
not exist primarily to maximize shareholder wealth.  Corporations have become 
important and powerful legal persons.  Social norms, embodied in laws regulating 
corporate governance do not condone the sort of amoral conduct that would result if 
corporations were to conceive of themselves purely as vehicles for the production of 
wealth.  Moreover, in exercising their business judgment for the benefit of the 
corporations that they manage, corporate officers and directors do not want shareholder 
wealth maximization to define their decision-making processes.  Enjoying as they do 
the benefits of deference to their business decisions that may be influenced by factors 
other than wealth-maximization, corporate managers cannot deny shareholders the 
ability to contribute to the decision-making process through social proposals. 
CONCLUSION 
Judging by the few court cases that address social proposals, one could easily 
conclude that cases like Lovenheim are akin to nuisance suits that have no on impact 
corporate governance because the proposals never win anything approaching a majority 
of the shareholder vote.  However, the cases themselves do not tell the full story behind 
social proposals.  While we cannot know for certain whether Peter Lovenheim’s 
proposal was the last straw that led Iroquois to discontinue its distribution of pâté de 
foie gras, it is clear from his subsequent experiences that social proposals can influence 
corporate decision-making processes.   
But are social proposals desirable?  If U.S. citizens want regulations preventing 
the distribution of products that promote inhumane treatment of animals, if they want to 
outlaw cluster bombs, if they want universal health care for all citizens or residents, or 
if they want all corporations to embrace affirmative action and renounce all forms of 
discrimination based on gender, race, religion, national origin, sexual preference or 
gender-identity, why is the political process inadequate?  Why should corporations foot 
                                                                                                                                               
community fund, hospital, charitable, philanthropic, educational, scientific or benevolent activities or 
patriotic or civic activities conducive to the betterment of social and economic conditions”). 
334
 Id. at 587. 
335
 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(13) (2003) (emphasis added). 
50 LAW REVIEW  2010 
the bill for the dissemination of all proposals relating to social issues of any significance 
that also have some sort of relation to the corporation’s business? 
As this Article has argued, the answer lies in the purpose of corporations. 
Opponents of social proposals tend to view corporations as vehicles for the generation 
of wealth, and they view shareholders as passive investors concerned only with 
maximizing the return on their investment.336  This view of corporations appears to be 
too narrow.  Both courts and legislatures permit corporate boards, in managing their 
corporations, to consider many factors other than shareholder wealth maximization.  
The SEC’s and the courts’ permissive approach to social proposals is thus consistent 
with other bodies of law that recognize that, because of the increasingly important role 
of corporations as legal persons within our society, there is a general expectation that 
corporations will behave responsibly. 
While it is difficult to prove that shareholder proposals help them to do so, the 
cost to corporations and to society of social proposals is minimal.  The best evidence 
that their usefulness outweighs the costs associated with social proposals may be the 
failure of corporations to mobilize to oppose them.  Corporate managers may recognize 
the value of exchange with their shareholders on social issues, and they may also 
grudgingly appreciate the consciousness-raising effect that social proposals can have.  
Iroquois Brands’ leadership may not have thought of itself as a corporation that catered 
to people committed to healthy lifestyles.  However, because of Peter Lovenheim’s 
proposal, it learned that it had a reputation for promoting food choices consistent with 
the humane treatment of animals.  That information was likely useful to the corporation, 
even if the process through which the corporation achieved enlightenment involved 
some pain and even some embarrassment. 
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